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Abstract
Despite their predominance in developing countries, production networks vary
enormously among countries and yet attempts to systematically compare their nature have
been done very sporadically in the literature. Drawing on relational contract theory, this
paper presents a novel framework for analyzing the differences in the ways production
networks organize themselves in emerging markets by utilizing successful Asian
organizational structures to illustrate strategy archetypes. The paper analyzes three different
relational employment and outsourcing contract forms through which the lead firm in a
production network can maintain a quasi-judicial role in resolving the contracting problems
inherent in multi-firm transactions. The production network templates embodied by Korean
chaebols, Japanese keiretsus and Taiwanese guanxi relationships use different explicit and
implicit contractual arrangements to adjudicate interparty disputes internally and can serve as
more appropriate benchmarks for firms operating in emerging markets as opposed to existing
templates based on mainstream strategy theories generated in developed countries.
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1. Introduction
Emerging markets have again become prominent in the world economy, receiving
growing attention over the past two decades because of their increasing share in world trade
and foreign direct investment (Hoskisson, Johnson, Tihanyi, & White, 2005; Lorenzen &
Mudambi, 2010; Ramamurti, 2009). This growing influence is reflected in the upsurge of
management research on emerging markets in recent years (Drummond, 2012; Wright,
Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005).
Despite the positive fanfare, emerging markets remain as challenging places in which
to do business due primarily to the weak institutional infrastructure, political uncertainty and
lack of market-based management skills that characterize many of these places (Hoskisson,
Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000). This limited development of political institutions stunts the
growth of complex transactions (North, 1997) by increasing costs related to the writing,
monitoring and implementation of formal inter-party contracts (Arruñada & Andonova, 2005;
Goldberg, 1976; Walsh & Seward, 1990). Since government contract enforcement and
private property protection procedures remain erratic in many developing countries, firms
substitute formal contracting processes with informal arrangements such as family ties,
business groups, corporate structures and political connections, which then play a stronger
role in corporate governance (Dieleman & Boddewyn, 2012; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton,
& Jiang, 2008). These institutional constraints limit the applicability of mainstream strategy
theories (Khanna & Palepu, 1997) with accumulating empirical evidence suggesting that
strategic management models originating in developed economies do not properly fit the
conditions prevalent in emerging markets (Narayanan & Fahey, 2005).
This rise in emerging markets has been facilitated by a sea change in the nature of
international production patterns (Ando, 2006; Lee, Gereffi, & Barrientos, 2012). As global
technological innovation intensifies the benefits of specialization, multi-firm production
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arrangements have increasingly become an oft-exercised choice for many manufacturers
(Arruñada & Vazquez, 2006; Milberg & Winkler, 2011). Firms are becoming increasingly
linked in different productive network relationships, thereby blurring the boundaries of the
firm to span the entire value-chain of production. Utilizing the production network as the unit
of analysis instead of the firm more closely mirrors the new dominant realities of sourcing
and production, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region where many of these manufacturing
relationships thrive (Ando, 2006; Athukorala, 2011; Borrus, Ernst, & Haggard, 2000).
This conceptual paper is aimed at providing alternative strategy templates for
organizing production networks in countries with limited third party contract enforcement
procedures, using successful Asian organizational structures to illustrate strategy archetypes
drawn from relational contract theory. Although the use of alternative firm structures to cope
with these institutional problems has long been proposed in the literature (Khanna & Palepu,
1997), understanding the diversity of forms by which these hybrid firm structures have
materialized has not been studied extensively in the literature (Schneider, 2009).
I contribute to this literature on understanding the variety of non-market, nonhierarchical production systems (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon,
2005; Schneider, 2009) by focusing on the contract mechanisms by which the lead firms in
these interfirm networks of production maintain a quasi-judicial role in resolving the inherent
contracting problems in multi-firm transactions. Such a framework allows us to dissect the
particular mechanisms utilized by each production network, and allow us to specify which of
these characteristics operate in relation to one another, providing a template by which
companies can organize themselves, in light of institutional problems inherent in emerging
markets.
The first section of the paper describes the concept of production networks and the
theories that describe how different production network structures can generate quasi-judicial
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mechanisms to overcome institutional deficiencies in emerging markets. The subsequent
section focuses on the three particular Asian production networks – the Japanese, Korean and
Taiwanese networks – that correspond with relational contracting templates and that can be
used as strategy archetypes to analyze inter-firm production arrangements in emerging
markets. The final section discusses potential applications of the framework to other
emerging market firms and enumerates avenues for further study.
2. Production Networks in Asian Emerging Markets
Production networks are defined as firms engaged in the joint production of goods and
services whose activities are linked to specific product areas (Brookfield & Liu, 2005;
Sturgeon, 2002). This process has been facilitated by the fragmentation of the different
product components, which allows firms to specialize in the creation of separate parts of the
final product and allows production to spread geographically to where resources for
production provide the highest level of competitive advantage (Arndt & Kierzkowski, 2001;
Feenstra, 1998). The main production decisions are organized globally by a lead buyer firm
whose decisions have the largest effects on the output of the entire production network
(Gereffi et al., 2005; Majumder & Srinivasan, 2007). Production networks operate with the
lead firm initiating the contracting process, followed by contracts propagating through the
tiers of the supply chain, both upstream and downstream (Majumder & Srinivasan, 2005).
These networks encompass the relationships not only between the lead firm and its affiliates,
but also including its subcontractors, suppliers, service providers and other firms participating
in cooperative agreements (Borrus et al., 2000).
Apart from understanding the capabilities of the different firms that comprise the
production network, the modality of relationships between these firms is equally important in
ensuring cost-effectiveness and quality control over the entire production process. The
traditional view of supply chain management is that of the arm’s-length or market model,
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which advocates minimizing dependence from suppliers and maximizing lead firm
bargaining power (Dyer, Cho, & Chu, 1998). This view involve the purchase of intermediate
goods through detailed short-term spot contracts from independent firms (Ménard, 2000;
Williamson, 1991). This preponderance of the market arrangement has been popularized by
mainstream strategy research which has long highlighted supplier power as among the prime
forces to be managed by firms (Porter, 1980). The key implication of this production
framework is that firms are encouraged to avoid any form of commitment to the supplier
(Dyer et al., 1998), lest the firm become overly dependent and thus beholden on that
economic entity.
However, the use of market arrangements is problematic in emerging markets. In
fact, the development of complex market transactions is made possible only through the
flourishing of institutional mechanisms that permit impersonal exchanges to take place
(North, 1997). As market transactions requires agreement between independent parties, a
third-party adjudicator, generally the state, becomes necessary to provide a legal environment
capable of increasing the capacity of parties to define the terms of exchange and to enforce
these agreements in light of unforeseen circumstances (Arruñada & Andonova, 2005).
If avoiding inter-firm dependence is not possible, firms are then advised to organize
themselves into vertically-integrated hierarchies to overcome the problems posed by
opportunistic behavior by dominant members of the supply chain (Williamson, 1985).
Hierarchies govern exchanges through flexible, long-term contracts that are enforced
internally via fiat or other intra-hierarchical incentives.
This dichotomous framework of arms-length market relations vis-a-vis vertical
integration had been widely accepted to be the most effective way to manage supplier
relationships until the success of Japanese firms using alternative models forced its reevaluation (Dyer et al., 1998). Further reevaluation became necessary when Korean and
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Taiwanese economies emerged as manufacturing powers, with alternative production systems
reflecting the diverse institutional processes in their home countries. These reevaluations tie
into a growing acceptance of the existence of the varieties of capitalism and business systems
that abound in different countries (Fitzgerald, 2000; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999), a
literature thread that has led to an enumeration of a growing number of heterogeneous
business form-typologies (Carney, Gedajlovic, & Yang, 2009), with an equivalent need for
greater understanding of the similarities across these diverse network structures.
This is paralleled with work in the institutional economics and sociology which talked
about the presence of hybrids (Williamson, 1991) and networks (Powell, 1990). Networks
and hybrids are neither hierarchical nor market-like in their structure or form of governance,
but instead incorporate certain market features, such as autonomous parties, as well as those
of the hierarchy, such as bilateral dependence and contract flexibility (Williamson, 1991).
The variety in theoretical and actual hybrid forms has led authors to similarly seek
mechanisms by which these forms can be distinguished and compared (Ménard, 2004)
There are two theoretical streams of reasoning for the existence of different
production networks structures in emerging markets (Hoskisson et al., 2000). The first, New
Institutional Economics, describes how certain institutions – property rights, governance
structures, and rules of exchange – enable the existence of exchange markets by defining the
behavior of actors during the transactions and defining the rules of the game (North, 1990).
Different historical antecedents generate national institutional contexts that encourage
distinctive forms of business and market organization by promoting and constraining the
development of particular ways of organizing economic activity (Fitzgerald, 2000; Whitley,
1992). These institutional theories explain why Japanese, Taiwanese and Korean-led
production networks generally maintain distinct organizational characteristics which they
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retain even as they internationalize (Buckley, 2009; Hatani, 2009; Lin & Chaney, 2007; Peng,
Wang, & Jiang, 2008).
The second theoretical framework draws on Transaction Cost Economics that
highlights how institutional imperfections and greater information asymmetry in emerging
markets expose contracting parties to opportunistic behavior (Peng, Lee, & Wang, 2005);
thus raising the costs of market transactions (Williamson, 1985) and require institutional
innovations, such as business group formation, for internalizing returns (Leff, 1978). This
line of reasoning has been formalized into the extensive literature of business groups (Khanna
& Palepu, 1997; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007), which has also been criticized as having
inconclusive results and potentially misleading conclusions due to its inability to deal with
enormous variation in business group structures (Granovetter, 2003; Luo & Chung, 2005).
This paper assuages some of these criticisms by shifting the unit of analysis on the
particular mechanisms used by the different organizational structures to achieve for quasijudicial control to overcome limitations of state contract enforcement instead of the business
group or network itself. Since quasi-judicial control is not an inherent property of the
structure of the production network per se – given that different mechanisms have been
developed to govern non-integrated networks as if they functioned as integrated systems -the focus of research must shift from the type of integration of the production network to the
control-coordination relations between the lead firm and the other member firms (Heide,
1994).
Apart from their success globally, the Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese production
networks were selected for this paper because although they have different structures for
organizing production (Redding, 1995), they maintain organizational features that offer
similar means in ensuring quasi-judicial control over the other producing firms. In essence,
production networks can overcome such institutional imperfections by instead using
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relational contracts with its own enforcement structures (Rajan & Zingales, 1998). The selfenforcing structure requires that the value of the future relationship must be sufficiently large
that neither party will wish to renege (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2002; Gibbons, 2005).
Most importantly, these relational contracts are isolated from state regulatory imperfections
because they are implicitly governed by forbearance which provides a quasi-jurisdictional
barrier to minimize state interference in intra-network disputes (Williamson, 1991).
At the same, the lead firm in each production network uses its authority to evaluate its
own and the other network members’ performance, as well as to impose due sanctions on
underperforming members. Safeguards against opportunistic behavior on the part of the lead
firms follow directly from the lead firms’ own interest in maintaining their reputation, their
relationship with their suppliers and through the continuing double role of judge and
interested party (Arruñada, 2000).
What makes these production networks distinct yet successful is that the lead firm is
able to focus their resources only on integral aspects of the quasi-judicial process, and yet
maintain retvain sufficient control over the entire network, albeit through different means.
Korean production networks rely mainly on extensive, centralized vertically-integrated
multinational production systems that source mainly form wholly- or partially-owned
subsidiaries that align ownership and management functions very tightly. The Japanese
production networks are comprised of separate firms united by collaborative agreements
driven by strong inter-organizational relations, mutual interdependence and long-term
commitment. Taiwanese production networks are also comprised of separate corporations
that instead draw upon close personal relationships and trust among the respective firm
owners (Whitley, 2000). In contrast, North American production networks generally display
arms-length market-based contracting, lacking the partnership-like characteristics of their
Asian counterparts (Borrus et al., 2000).
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The implicit assumption in this framework is that as institutions develop, the need for
such relational contracting diminishes and production networks should become dominated by
market relationships (Chung, 2006; Khanna, 2000; Peng, 2003; Peng et al., 2005) and thus
should more likely mimic North American-style supply chain structures dominated by armslength spot market contracting. However, due to the historical persistence of organizational
logics and the dynamic benefits of these relational contracts overlooked by mainstream
strategy theories, this may not necessarily be the case. In Asia, organizational forms of
production networks have failed to converge to a particular dominant model over time, even
during the 1990s when Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all faced economic crises (Borrus et
al., 2000). Although it has been argued that enduring globalization, improving institutional
quality and the sheer passage of time may decouple these forms from their national origins,
certain aspects of the network governance structure will likely remain, given how markets
tend to reward companies whose governance structure best matches with the environment
(Young, Ahlstrom, & Bruton, 2004). In fact, the continued existence of these peculiar yet
highly successful organizational forms may even be an indication of their being a source of
comparative advantage rather than an indication of institutional inertia-caused maladaptation.
In summary, the remarkable success of these Asian production networks in the global
arena indicates that each of these network structures can serve as a viable avenue for
structuring production in other emerging markets. The network structures studied in this
paper were selected also because they closely correspond to different relationship contracting
paradigms proffered in the economic literature. Detailing how these production networks
conform or diverge from theory can provide alternative strategic templates which firms may
imitate in order to efficiently overcome institutional deficiencies.
3. Quasi-Judicial Role of the Lead Firm in Korean, Japanese and Taiwanese
Production Networks
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The Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese business groups utilize organizational forms that
bestow a quasi-judicial function to the lead firm in order to overcome contract enforcement
constraints posed by imperfect institutional voids. To ensure the proper exercise of these
quasi-judicial functions, the selection of optimal contracting solutions which strengthen the
enforcing capacity of the internal judge becomes of prime importance (Arruñada, 2000).
Although all of these organizational forms utilize arrangements based on self-enforcing
relational contracts, they utilize diverse contract forms that allow these networks to achieve
performance. In fact, the relational governance structures have been seen as a source of
comparative advantage by allowing parties to economize on information costs related with
enforcement, lower inter-firm transaction costs and generate management against risk and
uncertainty (Dyer, 1996).
This study focuses on the particular quasi-judicial mechanisms to understand how
these networks obtain production efficiency through the use of the relational contract
typology is borrowed from the framework developed by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002).
These authors distinguish between formal spot contracts that require third-party enforcement
and relational contracts which are self-enforcing via the value of the future relationship that
must be sufficiently large that neither party will wish to renege. North American production
networks generally utilize more spot market-based contracts as compared with their Asian
counterparts (Borrus et al., 2000).
At the same time, Baker et al distinguish between two types of relational contracts:
employment contracts, where the productive assets are owned by the principal versus
relational outsourcing contracts, where the productive assets are owned by the agent (Baker et
al., 2002). Korean chaebol production networks are based on relational employment
contracts as these production networks are characterized by vertically integrated firms. On
the other hand, Japanese keiretsu and Taiwanese guanxi production networks are based on
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relational outsourcing contracts, as they are both characterized by non-integrated supply
transactions, with each firm owning its own assets. While Japanese relational outsourcing
contracts are enforced by inter-organizational ties, Taiwanese contracts are enforced through
interpersonal ties. A stylized typology to illustrate the differences among these relational
typologies is located in Figure 1, which includes the US production network as contrast.
____________________________________________________
Insert Figure 1 about here
____________________________________________________

To analyze the quasi-judicial organizational structure for each production network, I
utilize the framework developed by Arruñada (2000) used to analyze the contract
enforcement functions of large retailers on European supply chains. This framework
distinguishes three different aspects of the contracting process such as explicit contracting,
implicit contracting and disciplinary mechanisms. Table 1 summarizes the salient points of
the quasi-judicial mechanisms inherent in each of these networks.
____________________________________________________
Insert Table 1 about here
____________________________________________________

Prior to describing each network in detail, it must be noted that the Asian production
networks are not monolithic in its adherence to the stylized framework described (Hoetker,
2008). The unique nuance of each firm means that there are networks that do not reflect the
dominant pattern of their domestic economic configuration. Moreover, within each
production network, there exists a great variation in the relationships between firms,
subsidiaries and subcontractors based on the characteristics of the production component.
These exceptions do not invalidate the conclusion that there exists a dominant production
network configuration in each area, different from the US business model (Whitley, 1992).
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3.1. Korean Chaebol Production Networks
The larger Korean production networks are organized as highly diversified, verticallyintegrated firms called chaebols (Hamilton, 1996). These firms had their origins in the
Korean industrialization process, when underdeveloped markets and weak economic
institutions required particular organizational mechanisms built to overcome such
deficiencies (Chang & Hong, 2000). The chaebol did this by organizing itself in an extension
of the traditional hierarchical multi-divisional form with strong centralized control through
cross-share ownership as it grew (Chang & Choi, 1988). Since capital, labor and intermediate
product markets were non-existent, chaebols had to generate these resources internally. Early
chaebol expansion was characterized by extensive vertical integration to procure necessary
supplies and overcome market risks (Gamble, Morris, & Wilkinson, 2003; Kim, Hoskisson,
Tihanyi, & Hong, 2004).
3.1.1. Explicit contracting. The quasi-judicial role of the chaebol is based mainly on
explicit relational arrangements undertaken through a formal bureaucratic hierarchy
organized by the headquarters of the lead firm of the production network (Chang & Choi,
1988). Although the companies comprising the chaebol are legally independent entities, their
ownership and membership in the production network is unambiguous (van Hoesel, 1999).
As such, chaebol firms tend to vertically integrate suppliers of necessary parts rather than
enter into agreements with independent entities (Biggart & Guillen, 1999). Through these
relational employment contracts, these production networks are organized by top-down
decision making by the owners, internal enforcement of hierarchical relationships and little
autonomy by middle-management on decisions made above them (Whitley, 1992).
Although individual subsidiary companies have some autonomy on day-to-day
operations, strategic choices and resource allocation are made centrally often by the president
of the chaebol himself (Whitley, 1992). The epicenter of this decision-making structure is the
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group headquarters, which allocates financial and human resources, coordinates decisions
between affiliates and generates of long term strategies (Kim et al., 2004). This centralized
decision-making means that the chaebols are more integrated than conglomerates controlled
by purely financial mechanisms. In fact, the lead firm makes all pertinent decisions, including
decisions on personnel and labor management policies at the subsidiary levels with
managerial careers and rewards directly managed by the owner. Chaebol suppliersubsidiaries are also provided ample assistance by the lead firm in areas of quality control,
cost reduction, factory layout and inventory management, among others (Dyer et al., 1998).
This administrative structure is organized through an extensive bureaucratic structure
comprised of formal procedures and rules. Personal and collective loyalties are weak within
the chaebol and so compliance is secured through bureaucratic mechanisms, such as
managerial coercion and explicit incentive structures. There is no manifest belief that the
employees share the collective objectives of the firm, and so their compliance with firm
objectives is facilitated through strong leadership and forcefulness (Whitley, 1992).
3.1.2. Implicit contracting. Among the major distinguishing features of the Korean
chaebol is the dominance of the founder and its family (Hamilton & Biggart, 1988). Such
family ownership translates into strong family control, with most management positions in
the chaebol held by close relatives of the founders (Kim, 2003; Whitley, 1992). Because of
the low personal trust expected among firm employees, personal loyalty to the family owners
becomes increasingly important for managers to be appointed to senior roles. Moreover, the
application of the bureaucratic and control systems is unstandardized, providing scope for
personal variation and discretion by the business owners.
Another distinguishing feature of the chaebol is its diversified scope, involving the
ownership of other firms in businesses only tangentially related with each other (Feenstra,
Huang, & Hamilton, 2003; Kim, 2003). Such diversified group structure provides additional

- 13 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2083533

mechanisms to make up for inadequate institutions, like underdeveloped financial and labor
markets, and to hedge against market risks (Chang & Choi, 1988; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007).
As a mechanism for implicit control, these diversified business portfolios allow the chaebols
to build internal markets and share functions (Kim et al., 2004), making subsidiary firms
more dependent on the mother company. Good performing managers and engineers are
promoted within or across member companies both as a reward and as a means to transfer
expertise and control throughout the network. This movement of skilled staff enhances both
the overall capability of the chaebol and promotes the focal role of the owner (Whitley,
1992).
3.1.3. Disciplinary mechanisms. Because decision-making is conducted by a strong
central planning group that is responsible for allocating resources among member firms,
subsidiary firms have little scope for non-compliance. The authoritarian bureaucracy coupled
by the headquarters’ control over resources and internal policies make chaebol subsidiaries
absolutely dependent on the lead firm. Non-provision of bonuses, employee dismissal,
withdrawal of financial resources and other bureaucratic rules provide strong incentives for
each subsidiary firm to comply with production requirements of the network.
3.1.4. Summary. Korean production networks are characterized by centralized and
bureaucratic decision-making based on an extensive integrated set of firms and subsidiaries
owned by a dominant founder. These bureaucracies rely mainly on explicit contracts to
ensure quasi-judicial control by the owners over the subsidiaries, although laxity of formal
rule enforcement provides scope for implicit contracting based on personal connections with
the firm owners. Because of the centralized nature of production, links between the chaebol
and firms not integrated with the chaebol are weak and provide little scope for cooperation.
3.2. Japanese Keiretsu Production Networks
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Large Japanese firms are organized as non-integrated business groups or keiretsu. The
origins of this Japanese form has been attributed to differences in regulatory practices in
Japan, such as the limited institutional litigation capability, that made contract enforcement
difficult until recently (Ginsburg & Hoetker, 2006; Hoetker, 2008). This system is
characterized by a core lead firm surrounded by numerous long-term linkages between
suppliers and other members of the production network (Aoki & Lennerfors, 2012; Dyer,
1996; Lamming, 2000; Lenien, 2007). Each firm tends to incorporate only sub-sections of the
production process required to manufacture products. Subsidiary firms manufacture the basic
parts for major firms and other labor intensive aspects of production are subcontracted to
independent other enterprises with whom they develop close, stable, long-term relationships
(Whitley, 1992). This organizational structure is aimed at providing a mutually-beneficial,
self-sufficient industrial structure that effectively guards against market uncertainties (Orru,
Hamilton, & Suzuki, 1989; Tabeta & Rahman, 1999) without full vertical integration which
suppresses market incentives (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007).
3.2.1. Explicit contracting. The quasi-judicial mechanisms inherent in Japanese
production networks are based on relational outsourcing contracts promoting long-term
interdependence between the lead firm and its independent suppliers (Dore, 1983). Where the
Korean production network generally utilizes explicit contracts which include detailed job
descriptions, responsibilities, performance measures and hierarchical arrangements both
across subsidiaries and among employees within the subsidiaries, Japanese firms utilize more
supplier screening and socialization techniques to ensure goal congruence among firms and
employees by inculcating trust, commitment and group morale, over particular individual
roles and responsibilities (Whitley, 1992). The nature of such bilateral relationships requires a
stringent initiation process for employees and suppliers that include not only an assessment of
skills but also an assessment of organizational attitudes and values. Such stringent supplier
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selection processes are costly; for example, once a network affiliate finds a potentially
qualified supplier, it may take up to nine months to have the new supplier accredited by the
lead firm (Ernst, 2000). Essentially, such socialization procedures seek to eliminate goal
divergence and align incentives ex ante (Heide, 1994) and allow Japanese production
networks to experience lower transaction costs ex post than comparable arms-length-based
production networks (Dyer, 1996).
Once accepted into the production supply chain, member firms are rewarded with the
assurance that excellent performance would be rewarded with continuing business
(Lamming, 2000). These relationships generally limit the possibility of the supplier
conducting business with other firms (Tabeta & Rahman, 1999). The closeness generated by
these long-term contracts limits opportunism (Tabeta, 1998) and encourages the development
of suppliers that are more tailored to the lead firm’s requirements (Dyer et al., 1998). These
same long-term, mutual-dependence driven network practices are reflected in the
employment practices of individual firms, as lifetime employment and firm-specific skillbuilding among managers are prevalent practices in Japan (Whitley, 1992).
Members of the production network are provided decision autonomy, not only for
employment, work practices and salaries, but also on how to organize production, ensure
quality control and even procurement (Ernst, 2000). Thus, the lead firm is able to concentrate
only on its immediate suppliers, with interference by the lead firm in the relationship between
the supplier and further subcontractors are believed to promote confusion (Lamming, 2000).
Because this system relies on organizational congruence among members, much of
the operational rules and practices have been explicitly formalized and systematized.
Personnel matters and procedures have clear highly-specified rules and codification. The
cooperative nature of the organizational structure requires detailed work descriptions,
although these responsibilities are assigned to teams rather than individuals (Whitley, 1992).
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3.2.2. Implicit contracting. Decisions-making among network firms is facilitated by
constant interaction and monitoring between suppliers with the management of the lead firm
(Tabeta, 1998). Information sharing, technology transfer and cooperation are facilitated by
the provision of formal and informal avenues for discussions and meetings. Major suppliers
are sometimes organized into associations to disseminate managerial and technical know-how
(Gamble et al., 2003). To increase indirect control, the lead firm may provide expatriate
Japanese managers and engineers to aid in the coordination and help implement decisions
made by the lead firm (Buckley, 2009; Ernst, 2000). There can also some minority financial
investments, interlocking directorates and cross-share ownership by the lead firm in the
network firms (McGuire & Dow, 2003; Tabeta, 1998) not only to increase internal network
cohesion (Orru et al., 1989), but also to encourage management from instead of focusing on
its own shareholder value maximization and to pay attention towards long-term group
productivity (Lenien, 2007).
Ultimate control is retained by the lead firm by ensuring that strategic decisions and
high-value added production remains in their hands (Ernst, 2000). These control mechanisms
ensure that Japanese production network arrangements do not function as partnerships, since
the lead firm clearly has the dominant commercial interest (Lamming, 2000). The result has
been, despite decades of production network internationalization, a Japan-centered
production system consisting of captive suppliers highly dependent on the lead firm
(Buckley, 2009).
3.2.3. Disciplinary mechanisms. The main mechanism for disciplining production
network member firms, absent in the Korean chaebol case, is the retention of high-powered
market incentives. Japanese production network alliances, as opposed to vertically integrated
chaebols, are provided greater scope for access to residual profits and thus have stronger
incentives to improve and perform (Dyer, 1996). Although the lead firm generally sets prices
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for the suppliers, all profits generated by cost reductions accrue to the supplier – until the
prices are reset by the lead firm. This market incentive coupled with high specialization of the
production network supplier firms encourages significant efficiency improvements.
Generally, non-performance by the supplier means greater managerial involvement by
the lead firm in aiding the supplier in achieving the required targets. However, the nonintegrated network provides a final albeit seldom used disciplinary tactic, the potential to
dismiss the supplier and source from another firm. Although this mechanism is hardly used
due to the difficulty in replacing and retraining suppliers, increasing evidence indicates that
the recent economic recession in Japan coupled with the technological improvements in
companies operating in East Asia, have encouraged Japanese firms to utilize this ‘last-ditch’
mechanism more often (Lamming, 2000).
3.2.4. Summary. Japanese production networks are characterized by the widespread
use of organization based relational outsourcing in Japanese companies enables these
networks to overcome institutional deficiencies (Aoki & Lennerfors, 2012), generate certain
advantages of hierarchical systems while retaining the high-powered incentives inherent in
market transactions (Dyer, 1996). The considerable investment in organizational socialization
and screening increases the trust and cooperation among members and lowers transacting
costs throughout. The quasi-judicial structures promoted by these mutual obligation supplier
networks are seen not only as a mechanism for these firms to overcome the market
deficiencies they encountered during the origin of the Japanese economic miracle, but also as
playing a key role in the firms’ competitive advantage today.
3.3. Taiwanese Guanxi Production Networks
Taiwanese production networks are similar to the Japanese keiretsu network in its
structure comprised of independent firms that incorporate only subsections of the production
process and are coordinated by outsourcing contracts (Hamilton, 1996). However, the key
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difference is that the network is characterized by small and medium-sized enterprises whose
competitiveness relies on the close interpersonal familial or clanship ties called guanxi rather
than organizational linkages (Hamilton & Biggart, 1988; Wang, 2007). Even as the
production networks internationalize, they generally do so through ethnic and personal
connections of the owners (Sim & Pandian, 2003).
3.3.1. Explicit incentives. The quasi-judicial mechanisms utilized by Taiwanese lead
firms are based on family ties and strong reciprocal ties rather than explicit incentives.
Hence, the coordination of these networks are conducted not by a chaebol hierarchy or by
organized keiretsu consensus, but instead via a set of core leaders who occupy leadership
positions in the various group firms (Chung, 2003). This inner circle functions mainly as a
means to disseminate information throughout the network and to provide certain services like
training, public relations and consulting. Unsurprisingly, the use of formal coordination and
control procedures among firms in the production network is very limited (Whitley, 1992).
This lack of explicit contractual safeguards is important for the quasi-judicial functions of the
lead firm to ensure that the intrinsic personal motivation is not undermined (Fehr & Falk,
2002).
Nonetheless, for certain investments explicit ownership sharing arrangements and
duplicate chairmanships among partners may be created to inject further strength into the
interpersonal ties governing the production network (Chung, 2003). Particularly as businesses
require more substantial financing or access to different social networks, production network
member firms enter into cross-ownership alliances and joint ventures with trusted guanxi
partners (Whitley, 1992). Unlike their Japanese lead firm-subordinate relationship, these
production networks are characterized as partnerships united by mutual trust and common
investments among the persons involved.
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3.3.2. Implicit incentives. The Taiwanese production networks are run mainly
through implicit incentives. Rather than a central administrative hierarchy, these firms are
connected through a network of alliances and particular guanxi ties between the owners
which vary in performance and cohesion (Hamilton, 1996; Whitley, 1992). The dependence
on family and clanship ties to promote greater cooperation and social embeddedness is based
on an inherent instinct among individuals to cooperate with people they are related to
(Arruñada, 2005), which promotes stronger trust and reciprocity (Luo & Chung, 2005) that
promotes information sharing, reduces risk of contract disputes, and allows for firms to
transact with less monitoring and explicit contractual safeguards (Chiles & McMackin, 1996;
Khanna & Palepu, 2000). Although this lack of explicit incentives and formalized procedures
reduces transaction costs, the establishment of guanxi itself consumes much time and energy
(Richter, 2002), as well as provides limits to the ability of these firms to locate partners with
the ideal set of resources that may be outside the guanxi network (Arruñada, 2005; Kao,
1996).
The strongly personalistic aspects of network management are also reflected within
the internal structure of member firms. These member firms rely mainly on informal personal
means for coordinating decisions rather than formal authority relations. The need for strong
personal control for each firm makes achieving scale problematic for individual enterprises
and has led to extensive subcontracting among small- and medium-sized firms (Redding,
1995). In fact, Taiwanese firms historically grow not by enlarging, but by spinning off
additional small firms (Biggart & Guillen, 1999). As such, these production networks are able
to achieve scale and competitiveness through the network’s ability to share orders, production
facilities and personnel among members of the production network, without losing the
flexibility required to compete in dynamic industries (Hamilton, 1996; Wang, 2007).
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The presence of the strong interpersonal network ultimately reduces pressures for
costly vertical integration (Granovetter, 1985) and promotes a production system that allows
for greater production flexibility, quick response to market changes, complex adaptation and
opportunity-seeking for the entire network (Biggart & Guillen, 1999; Kao, 1996; Whitley,
1992). The extensive network of small-firms not only provides the critical role of aligning
the manufacturing process but also for mobilizing capital and obtaining market information.
The owners of each firm maintain strong control over financial, strategic and
personnel matters, being reluctant to trust formal information systems or formal managerial
hierarchies. As such, there is great reluctance to delegate decision-making to managers who
do not have close personal ties with the owners of the lead firm (Richter, 2002). The entities
maintain lower degrees of work specialization and standardization, with tasks and jobs more
diffusely delineated and loosely defined (Whitley, 1992). Even recruitment decisions are
based on personal connections and contacts (Kao, 1996). The critical role of family
ownership and informal control of the production network results in a highly personal
decision-making style that is flexible and responsive to environmental change (Uzzi, 1997).
3.3.3. Disciplinary mechanisms. Much like in the Japanese case, the main
mechanism for discipline is the retention of high-powered market incentives. Taiwanese
firms retain their financial dependence and are subject to changing market forces. The market
risks faced by each individual firm are managed largely through the guanxi network itself, via
its ability to provide financing, resource flexibility and diversification into other businesses.
For ensuring compliance with the production network needs, the lead firm relies
mainly on the strong interpersonal ties built among the individual firm owners. Given the
importance of guanxi, not just in the business sphere but also the social spheres of the
individual owners, non-compliance with the requirements of the group provides a strong

- 21 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2083533

disciplinary sanction to owners. The extent of these interpersonal ties is so strong that
additional disciplinary mechanisms are unnecessary or even counter productive.
3.3.4. Summary. Taiwanese production networks are comprised of independent
small and medium-sized firms united by the interpersonal connections between their owners.
The quasi-judicial enforcement mechanisms used by the lead firm in this case relies solely on
the strong reciprocal ties among firm owners which limit the need and usefulness of explicit
contracting arrangements. This personalistic nature of the organizational structure allows for
greater flexibility and unencumbered decision-making, while the strong interpersonal
connections among the firm-owners provide mechanisms for managing against market risks.
4. Discussion
This conceptual paper aims to contribute to the field of emerging market strategy
theories by highlighting the different mechanisms by which production networks can be
organized in areas where third-party contract enforcement is problematic. Each of the three
East Asian archetypes described above utilize alternative means of relational contracting that
generates a quasi-judicial role for the lead firm in the network. Under each network
structure, the lead firm focuses on particular mechanisms of the quasi-judicial process, be
they formal or informal contracting systems, allowing it to achieve control while minimizing
transaction costs through the non-duplication of costly hierarchical or extra-contractual
instruments.
In the Korean case, the chaebol utilizes a large bureaucratic structure where the asset
ownership and centralized decision-making provides full control over the production process
and provides explicit incentives to ensure subsidiary compliance. In the Japanese case, the
keiretsu forms long-term outsourcing contracts with independent organizations that provide
both market incentives and explicit controls through interdependence. In Taiwan, the guanxi-
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based production networks are comprised of independent firms tied together through implicit
contracts enforced by strong interpersonal ties.
For each of these archetypes, the use of a dominant relational contract precludes the
use of alternative means of contract enforcement to minimize transaction costs and also
achieves other benefits such as production flexibility and risk management. For example, the
reliance of Taiwanese firms on interpersonal ties allows it to do away with costly
bureaucratic practices and layers of management that may impede the managerial processes.
Based on these archetypes, one can make arguments that firms in emerging markets
can improve performance by more closely streamlining the organization’s control
mechanisms toward the dominant relational-contract type, rather than copying strategy norms
generated in developed countries. For example, instead of following the call for chaebols to
improve performance by deconglomeration, it may be more optimal to argue that the chaebol
should instead becoming more bureaucratic and professional by limiting the use of informal
contracts like ties to the patriarch-owner for achieving managerial control. This premise is
validated by empirical findings demonstrating how although chaebol memberships still adds
value by lowering transaction costs, facilitating resource pooling and risk sharing (Chang &
Choi, 1988; Chang & Hong, 2000), governance improvements through the use of
independent directors and minimizing family control do improve performance in Korean
firms (Choi, Park, & Yoo, 2007; Joh, 2003). Empirical findings also highlight the usefulness
of family relations in improving performance among Taiwanese firms especially during times
of institutional change and uncertainty (Luo & Chung, 2005). Although other studies indicate
that the positive impact of chaebol integration or guanxi reliance diminish over time (Chang
& Hong, 2002; Chung, 2003, 2006; Joh, 2003), these changes occurred mainly as governance
institutions improved, which may not necessarily be the case in many emerging markets.
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It is hoped that these three contracting archetypes can be further quantified and used
to analyze the strategies of firms from other emerging markets that have become increasingly
important in recent years. It would be helpful to understand how archetypal production
networks from India, China, Southeast Asia and Latin America measure up against these
templates to ascertain whether their conformance or non-conformance aids in their overall
performance. This may reveal alternative relational contract forms that may be applicable to
other emerging markets.
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Table 1
Summary of Quasi-Judicial Role of Lead Firm in the East Asian Archetypes

Contract
Type
Explicit
Contracting

Implicit
Contracting

Disciplinary
Sanctions

Korean Chaebol
Relational Employment

Japanese Keiretsu
Relational Outsourcing
– Organizational
Customer-supplier
relationships
Long-term contracting

Taiwanese Guanxi
Relational Outsourcing
- Interpersonal
Direct ownership
Interpersonal
partnerships
Centralized decision
Alliances and joint
making
ventures
Bureaucratic procedures Screening, socialization, Limited bureaucracy,
and formal procedures
personal decisionmaking
Paternalistic – family
Intra-network
Kinship – family ties
ownership
coordination,
associations
Cross-ownership of
Control over key
Personal control
unrelated firms
components
Bureaucratic sanctions
Market sanctions
Market sanctions
Withholding of
Cooperation and remote Saving face, reputation
resources
possibility of
and trust
termination

Figure 1
Illustration of Relational and Spot Contracting Propensity by
Different Production Network Archetypes

Korea
Spot Outsourcing

Japan

Taiwan

Relational Outsourcing

US
Relational Employment
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